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Abstract—In this paper we discuss how conventional business
contracts can be converted into smart contracts—their electronic
equivalents that can be used to systematically monitor and
enforce contractual rights, obligations and prohibitions at
run time. We explain that emerging blockchain technology
is certainly a promising platform for implementing smart
contracts but argue that there is a large class of applications,
where blockchain is inadequate due to performance, scalability,
and consistency requirements, and also due to language
expressiveness and cost issues that are hard to solve. We
explain that in some situations a centralised approach that
does not rely on blockchain is a better alternative due to
its simplicity, scalability, and performance. We suggest that
in applications where decentralisation and transparency are
essential, developers can advantageously combine the two
approaches into hybrid solutions where some operations are
enforced by enforcers deployed on–blockchains and the rest by
enforcers deployed on trusted third parties.
Keywords: Smart Contracts, Blockchain, Monitoring,
Enforcement, On chain, Off chain, IoT, Privacy, Trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on scenarios where two or more parties
interact with each other to conduct business over the Internet.
Typical scenarios involve consumers and providers where the
latter sell tangible items or computing services to the former. A
specific example is the selling of personal data collected from
IoT sensors or social media applications to data consumers.
We assume that the business parties involved are reluctant
to trust each other unguardedly; that is, without software
mechanisms that assure that 1) all parties act in accordance
with some agreed upon rules, and 2) performed actions are
indelibly recorded on means that make them undeniable and
examinable, for example, to determine the sequence of actions
that led to an unexpected outcome and subsequent dispute.
In conventional business, the mechanisms normally used in
these situations are business contracts supported by ledgers.
The contract stipulates what actions the parties are expected
to execute, while the ledger is used to record the history of
the actions that have been executed. It is widely accepted that
equivalent mechanisms are also needed in electronic business.
An emerging solution that is currently being explored to
address this question is smart contracts built on the basis
of blockchain technologies [1] [2]. Examples of such tech-
nologies are Bitcoin [3], Ethereum [4] and Hyperledger [5].
However, blockchain-based smart contracts are only at their
initial research stage, and plagued with questions about their
scalability, performance, transaction costs and other questions
that emerge from their descentralised nature.
This article makes the following contributions to help clarify
some of these issues. i) We explain that there are different
approaches to implement smart contracts ranging from cen-
tralised to decentralised. ii) We explain the advantages and
disadvantages of these approaches and argue that their suitabil-
ity in solving the problem depends on the particularities of the
application, the assumptions made about the application, and
the facilities offered by the blockchain technology available.
iii) We argue that there is a large class of applications that can
benefit from a hybrid solution.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Sec-
tion II presents a contract example to motivate the use of smart
contracts. In Section III, we introduce smart contracts and de-
scribe the difference between the centralised and decentralised
variations. Section IV discusses implementation alternatives of
smart contracts (the main contribution of the paper). Section V
places our work within past and current contexts. In Section
VI, we present some concluding remarks and raise questions
that in our view, need research attention.
II. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
An illustrative example of a contractually regulated IoT
application of our research interest is shown in Fig. 1.
Alice is a person in possession of personal data that she
would like to sell and as such she plays the role of a Data
seller. The Data Buyer (represented by Bob) is a company
interested in buying data from Alice. Alice gathers her data
from different sources, such as her social network activities,
body sensors and domestic sensors, as envisioned in [6]. For
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Fig. 1. Data trading regulated by a smart contract.
simplicity and to frame the discussion, we assume that Alice
is trading only her data collected from her domestic sensors.
Like in [6], we assume that Alice stores her data in a personal
repository, perhaps located in the cloud. Like in the ”Hat”
project [7], we assume that Alice is the absolute owner of the
data and that she is entitled to negotiate with potential data
buyers how to trade her data, i.e., to whom to sell it to, when,
and under which conditions. The negotiation process can be
as sophisticated as needed. Since this issue falls outside of the
scope of this paper, we consider only a simple accept or reject
the offer as it is negotiation process.
As explained in [1], realistic conventional legal contracts are
complex documents, written for example in English. Normally
these documents include inconsistencies and ambiguities that
are tolerable because they are expected to be interpreted with
the help of human judgment. However because contracts do
contain inconsistencies and ambiguities, their full conversion
to electronic equivalents is a challenging task that falls outside
the ambitions of this paper. However we refer the reader to
previous research efforts in this direction [8] [9] [10] [11]. The
focus of our work is on specific clauses of the contracts that
are stipulated sufficiently precise that makes them amenable
to computer language encoding.
We believe that to be of practical use, a smart contract needs
to include clauses that take into consideration normal and
undesirable paths of the business process. The latter account
for the occurrence of exceptional situations. Examples of
exceptions in our example are failures to deliver the payment
or the data before a deadline or failure to deliver a valid
payment or data of the expected quality. An example of
contractual clauses that Alice and Bob can use to regulate
their data trading are the following:
1) The buyer (Bob) is entitled to present the data seller
(Alice) with offers to buy data collected from Alice’s
domestic sensors.
2) The data seller is free to use her discretion to either
reject the offer or accept the offer as it is.
a) The data seller is expected to send a notification
of offer acceptance within 36 hrs of receiving the
offer, when she decides to accept it.
b) Failure to send a notification will be considered as
offer rejection.
3) The data buyer is obliged to send the payment to the
data seller within 24 hrs of receiving the notification of
acceptance.
a) Failure to meet his obligation will result in an
abnormal termination of the agreement to be sorted
out off line.
4) The data seller is obliged to send a notification of
payment acceptance to the data buyer within 24 hrs
of collecting the payment.
a) Failure to meet his obligation will result in an
abnormal termination of the agreement to be sorted
out off line.
5) The data seller is obliged to make the data available to
the data seller within 24 hrs of collecting the payment
and maintain the data repository accessible during the
following seven days.
6) The Data buyer is entitled to place data requests against
the data seller repository without exceeding 24 data
requests per day.
7) The data buyer is entitled to close the repository upon
expiration of the seven day period.
8) This agreement will be considered successfully complete
when the seven day period expires.
The clauses include several contractual operations that we
have highlighted in bold such as offer to buy data, reject the
offer, accept the offer, send a notification of offer acceptance,
send payment, etc. Though the clauses are relatively simple,
they are realistic enough to illustrate our arguments.
III. SMART CONTRACTS: BACKGROUND
A smart contract is an event–condition–action stateful com-
puter program, executed between two or more parties that are
reluctant to trust each other unguardedly. It can be regarded
as Finite State Machine (FSM) that keeps a state that models
the development (from initiation to completion) of a shared
activity[12]. For instance, in [13] [14], the state is used for
modeling changes in rights, obligations and prohibitions as
they are fulfilled or violated by the parties.
Research on executable contracts can be traced back to the
mid 80s and early 90s [15], [16]. In 1997, Szabo used the term
smart contract [17] to refer to contracts that can be converted
into computer code and executed. However, commercial inter-
est in smart contracts emerged only in 2008 motivated by the
publication of Satoshi’s Bitcoin paper [18] that inspired the
development of cryptocurrencies, smart contracts and other
distributed applications. Satoshi departed from the centralised
approach taken in previous research and demonstrated how
smart contracts can be decentralised.
A. Centralised and decentralised smart contracts
Depending on the number of instances (copies) of the smart
contract deployed to monitor and enforce the contract we
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Fig. 2. Centralised and descentralised implementation of a smart contract.
distinguish between centralised and decentralised (distributed)
approaches (Fig. 2).
In the figure, A and B are business partners, for example,
Alice and Bob of our contract example of Section II. SC is the
corresponding smart contract. op stands for operation executed
against SC, rp is the corresponding response. TTP node is a
node under the control of a Trusted Third Party. N1, . . . , N4
are untrusted nodes. CP stands for Consensus Protocol. As
shown in Fig. 2–a), a contract can be implemented as a cen-
tralised application that uses a single instance of the smart con-
tract (SC) running in the TTP node. Besides the disadvantages
that a TTP introduces (single point of failure, trust placed on
the TTP, etc.) this approach is comparatively simpler that the
decentralised approach. The decentralised approach relies on a
set of untrusted nodes instead of a single TTP that are used for
running several identical instances (shown as SC1, . . . , SC4)
of the smart contract. In this approach, A and B are free to
place their operation against any of the instances. The price
that the decentralised approach pays for getting rid of the
TTP is that the untrusted nodes must run a consensus protocol
to verify that a given operation has been executed correctly,
and to keep the states of SC1, . . . , SC4 identical. Depending
on the protocol used, its computational, communication and
performance degradation cost might be unbearable [19] or
its consistency guarantees inadequate [20] to the extent of
rendering the decentralised approach unsuitable.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ALTERNATIVES
We will take the example of Section II and highlight
the advantages and disadvantages of three implementation
alternatives.
A. Centralised implementation
A centralised implementation is shown in Fig. 3. The role of
the SC is played by the CCC (Contract Compliance Checker)
developed at the University of Newcastle. We use CCC and SC
synonymously in this section. The CCC is a FSM written in
Java that accepts contractual clauses encoded as business rules
written in the Drools language [13]. The state of the FSM is
altered by the execution of contractual operations (op) initiated
by the business partners, such as offer to buy data, and send the
payment. The FSM running within the CCC keeps track of the
state of the business process executed between Bob and Alice,
and on this basis it determines if a given operation is contract
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Fig. 3. Centralised smart contract.
compliant (cc) or non contract compliant (ncc). The CCC is
used to control the gateway that grants access to Alice’s data.
For example, when Bob wishes to access Alice’s data, he
i) issues the corresponding operation against the gateway, ii)
the gateway forwards the operation to the CCC, iii) the CCC
evaluates the operation in accordance with its business rules
that encode the contractual clauses and responds with either
cc or ncc to open or close the gateway, respectively, iv) the
opening of the gateway allows Bob’s operation to reach the
data repository and retrieve the response (rp) that travels to
Bob. Note that, to keep the figure simple, the arrows show
only the direction followed by operations initiated by Bob.
It is worth elaborating on the following points. Observe that
in the architecture all the operations are presented to the SC
for evaluation. The operation rate is not a problem because
the architecture involves only a single instance of the SC, i.e.,
there is no need to run consensus protocols. Likewise, the
contract clauses are encoded in the Drools languages which
are executed by a FSM implemented in Java. This means
that we have a Turing complete programming environment
that allows us to encode and implement clauses of arbitrary
complexity. Unfortunately, the centralised approach introduces
several drawbacks. For example, the contracting parties need
to trust the TTP to collect undeniable and indelible records
of the actions executed by the contracting parties and make
them available upon request to parties that are entitled to see
them, say to sort out disputes. At the technical level, the TTP
node is a single point of failure. Another issue is that the
execution of the payment operation is also centralised, we
assume a conventional bank card payment mediated by a bank
as opposed to cryptocurrency payment.
B. Descentralised implementation
A descentralised architecture is shown in Fig. 4. Four
instances of the smart contract (SC1, . . . , SC4) are deployed
in four nodes N1, . . . , N4 (one each) of a blockchain platform.
Each operation initiated by a business partner is executed
against the contract; the contract determines if the operation
is contract compliant (cc) or non contract compliant (ncc) and
responds to both business partners accordingly. The response
is also sent to the gateway to open or close it, accordingly.
To keep the figure simple, we show only the communication
lines between the Data buyer, SC1 and the gateway; and
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Fig. 4. Descentralised smart contract.
between the Data seller, SC3 and the gateway. Yet we assume
that a given operation can be presented to any of the four
instances of the smart contract and that any of them can
respond to the business partners and the gateway
The salient feature of the decentralised implementation is
the replication of the smart contract, consequently, there is no
dependency on a single party. The cost to pay for this benefit
is the execution of the consensus protocol among the instances
which can significantly impact the performance of the smart
contract in terms of number of operations (called transactions
in blockchain terminology) per second that it can analyse,
and the response time to complete a transaction. For example,
Bitcoin, a public blockchain that uses a Proof of Work (PoW)
consensus algorithm, can only process about 7 transactions
per second. Another problem with Bitcoin is its consistency
latency: its PoW algorithm offers only eventual consistency
that might take Bitcoin about an hour (or longer) to approve
and indelibly include a transaction in its blockchain [21].
Ethereum operating under PoW consensus suffer from similar
drawbacks. Permissioned blockchains like Hyperledger rely
on lighter consensus algorithms such as Proof of State (PoS).
However, applications where eventual consistency is unsafe,
demand strong consistency [20]. Strong consistency can only
be delivered by communication intensive consensus protocols
such as Byzantine Fault Tolerant protocols, unfortunately,
these protocols suffer from scalability issues [19]. Some smart
contract applications (for example, applications that require
instantaneous payment or the delivery of real time data) fall
within this category. Another issue that impacts decentralised
approaches that rely on public blockchains is the transaction
fee incurred by each operation analysed by the smart contract.
In this order, it would be insensible to take a decentralised im-
plementation approach for the contract example of Section II
if the data buyer was to place a large number of operations to
retrieve small pieces of data under stringent time constraints.
C. Hybrid implementation
Fig. 5 shows the architecture of a hybrid implementation.
It combines features from the centralised and decentralised
approaches discussed, respectively, in Sections IV-A and IV-B.
We separate the contractual operations into two classes: de-
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Fig. 5. Hybrid smart contract.
centralised operations (d–op) that need blockchain support and
operations that can be executed in a centralised fashion (c–op).
d–op operations are encoded using the descentralised approach
and enforced by the instances (SC1, . . . , SC4) whereas oper-
ation of the c–op category are encoded using the centralised
approach and enforced by the CCC.
The designer separates the contractual operation into d–op
and c–op on the basis of several criteria. As examples, we
can mention some key parameters related to the blockchain
technology. The list is meant to be illustrative rather then
exhaustive. Complementary advise is discussed in [22], [23]
where they take into account privacy concerns along with
computation and data storage costs.
One decision criterion is the expressiveness of the language
used for writing the contract. For instance, if the blockchain
does not offer a Turing–complete language, the implementers
needs to keep the d–op category simple. Bitcoin for example,
offers only a stack–based opcode scripting language that does
not support loops or flow control structures. In contrast, in
a blockchain platform like Ethereum that offers a Turing–
complete language the designer can afford to pass as much
complexity to the decentralised part of the figure as she
wishes to. Another decision criterion is the transaction fee
which is an issue in private blockchains like Bitcoin and
Ethereum but not in Hyperledger [24] when it is operated as a
permissioned blockchain. For example, Bitcoin and Ethereum
have already experienced average transaction fees of 54.90
and 4.15 USD, respectively [25]. Another central parameter
to take into account is the performance of the blockchain, for
example, the number of transactions per second and consis-
tency requirements as explained in Section IV-B. Operations
that demand strong consistency would be good candidates to
be implemented as c–op. The performance of the blockchain
is especially relevant to IoT applications where transactions
must be automatically monitored to ensure that they perform
under strict Quality of Service requirements. For example one
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could easily imagine an additional clause being added to the
contract in Section II requiring the repository to process each
request for data at a particular rate that would be too fast to be
monitored using a smart contract deployed on a blockchain.
In such a scenario, a centralised smart contract would be
more logical, whereas the blockchain would be used to record
important milestone events such as the sending and receipt of
payments for received data.
We envision that the centralised and descentralised integra-
tion can be operated in several ways, including the following:
1) Indelible blockchain–based log: We can operate the
blockchain–based part of Fig. 5 as a passive log that records
events that the parties consider worth duplicating in the
blockchain as well as in the TTP node. By passive we mean
that SC1, . . . , SC4 are not involved in enforcing activities—
this is entirely the responsibility of the CCC. This arrangement
is useful when one or more of the contracting parties is
reluctant to trust the TTP blindly, say because it is deployed
within the buyer’s premises— currently a common business
practice [26]. In this arrangement, the d–op set will include
operations aimed at creating additional records while c–op will
include all the contractual operation like in IV-A. The CCC
and SC1, . . . , SC4 operate independently from each other.
2) Cryptocurrency–based payment channel: The data buyer
of the example of Section II can take advantage of payment
services offered by a public blockchain (for example, Bitcoin)
and use the top part of Fig. 5 to pay in satoshis. This
approach is recommended only when the payment operation
is significantly larger than the transaction fees and is not
repetitive. In this arrangement, the d–op set will include only
the send the payment operation stipulated in clause 3. In this
arrangement, the CCC requires the assistance of the smart
contract running in the blockchain (SC1, . . . , SC4) only to
verify that the data buyer has fulfilled his obligation to pay. For
instance, the data buyer application can submit his payment
through Bitcoin, wait for the confirmation of his transaction,
collect the evidence and submit it to the CCC.
3) Off-blockchain execution of operations: In this arrange-
ment the CCC running in the TTP node is used as an off the
blockchain channel. The designer places in the d–op set only
the contractual operations that need decentralised treatment
and leaves the remaining in the c–op. Naturally, operations that
cannot be executed in the decentralised blockchain because of
the issues discussed in Section IV-B need to be included in
c–op set. A good candidate operation to place in the d–op set
is send the payment (see Section IV-C2). Another candidate
is close the repository when the data seller wishes to generate
indelible records about the closing time of her repository and
completion of the contract. The remaining operations can be
cheaply and efficiently enforced by the CCC, the inclusion
of place data requests (clause 6), in the c–op set is highly
desirable because its recurrence would incur high accumulative
transaction fees.
It is worth clarifying that there are some similarities between
the deployment shown in Fig.5 and the lightning channels for
executing off–blockchain payments in Bitcoin [27]. However,
observe that in lighting networks the aim is to create channels
for conducting micro–payment operations off the blockchain
to save on transaction fees. In contrast, in Fig. 5 we use the
CCC (a complete contractual enforcing tool) to execute most
of the contractual operations off–blockchain. Operations from
both sets are independently converted to smart contracts and
enforced at run time.
V. RELATED WORK
Research on smart contracts was pioneered by Minsky in
the mid 80s[15] and followed by Marshall [16]. Though some
of the contract tools exhibit some descentralised features [28],
those systems took mainly centralised approaches. Within this
category falls [29] and [30]. To the same category belongs
the model for enforcing contractual agreements suggested by
IBM [31] and the Heimdhal engine [32] aimed at monitoring
state obligations (see clause 5 of the contract example, main-
tain the data repository accessible). Directly related to our
work is the Contract Compliant Checker reported in [13] [14]
which also took a centralised approach to gain in simplicity
at the expense of suffering from all the drawbacks that
TTPs inevitably introduce. Smart contracts were known as
executable contracts or electronic contracts in [12] [8] [33],
where the important issues of smart contract representation
and verification were discussed. A pioneering implementation
of a descentralised contract enforcer is discussed in [34].
The central idea of the authors is the use of a distributed
middleware (one piece associated to each party) that is
responsible for keeping indelible records of the operations
executed by each party. The middleware (called a Business to
Business object [35]) is in essence an indelible ledger similar
in funcionality to the hyperledger used by current blockchains.
The publication of the Bitcoin paper [18] motivated the
development of several platforms for supporting the implemen-
tation of decentralised smart contracts. Platforms in [3], [4] [5]
and [36] are some of the most representative. A good summary
of the features offered by these and other platforms can be
found in [2]. Though they differ on language expression power,
fees and other features discussed in Section IV-B they are
convenient for implementing descentralised smart contracts.
The hybrid approach that we suggest addresses problems that
neither the centralised or descentralised approach can address
separately and was inspired by the off–blockchain payment
channel discussed in [27], [3]. The concept of logic–based
smart contracts discussed in [37] has some similarities with
our hybrid approach. They suggest the use of logic–based
languages in the implementation of smart contracts capable
of performing on–chain and off–chain inference. The difficulty
with this approach is lack of support of logic–based languages
in current blockchain technologies. In our work, we rely on
the native languages offered by the blockchain platforms, for
example, Ethereum’s Solidity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The central aim of this paper is to argue that conventional
business contracts can be automated (at least partially) and
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that depending on several factors, the centralised approach
suits some applications but others demand descentralised im-
plementations or even hybrid implementations. We are only
starting to explore hybrid implementation of smart contracts,
yet on the basis of the study of the APIs (JSON–RPC) that
Bitcoin, Ethereum and Hyperledger offer, the idea seems
implementable. Also, it is of practical interest as it would
offer a pragmatic answer to the scalability problems that
afflict current blockchain platforms. Equally importantly, this
approach opens several research questions.
Another issue is the interaction between the centralised
(CCC) and descentalised components. In Fig. 5 they cannot
communicate directly. We are currently working on a ver-
sion of the CCC that can be deployed as a micro–service
capable of interacting with the JSON-RPC Client API that
blockchain technologies offer. Precisely, we are investigating
how the hybrid architecture can be realised using the Ethereum
blockchain and a CCC implemented as a decentralised appli-
cation (DApp) [38]. The relationship (directly or indirectly)
between the CCC and the blockchain raises several questions
that need further investigation. They can interact directly,
indirectly, tightly or loosely. Fig. 5 suggests the latter where,
for example, the CCC can fail and recover while the send
the payment operation is taking place through the block–
chain based smart contract (recall in Bitcoin it might take
longer that 24 hrs to complete a transaction). However, in
some applications a tight relationship might be desirable to
hold or divert the progress of one of the contracts when its
counterpart experiences an exception or fails. The point is
about understanding how to separate the contractual operations
into c–op and d–op in a manner that the two contracts
collaborate instead of conflicting with each other. For contracts
with scores of clauses, this issue might require the assistance
of model–checking tools to ensure that the whole contractual
clauses are consistent and that the two sets do not conflict with
each other [39], [40].
Another issue is the language for writing the contract. It
is arguably accepted that declarative languages (rule based
languages in particular) are more convenient than imperative
to encode contractual clauses. This feature is enjoyed by the
CCC. However, current blockchain platforms support only
imperative languages (for example Ethereum’s Solidity). This
means that in our hybrid approach the contract will be written
in two different languages which will make their interaction
less intuitive. Ideally blockchain platforms should support
declarative languages, or alternatively developers should be
offered a declarative language that can be automatically trans-
lated to languages like Solidity or Drools as needed.
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